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PETER

H. ROHN

*

A Computer Search in Soviet Treatiest
The present article explores some of the implications of what
happens when a typical research question in international law is
asked against a computerized data bank. The question concerns
the role of international institutions in Soviet treaties. The data
bank covers the United Nations Treaty Series. The particular method
of legal research is a man-machine combination. We will trace,
step by step, the interplay of question-computer-answer in an actual
search case. Then we will try to generalize from the case-in
methodology, in substance, and in policy.
I-Chronology
The sequence of events in the case was as follows. The American
Society of International Law established an informal working group
on electronic data processing and international law documentation.
An exploratory meeting was held in 1966 to survey on-going work
in this field.' A second meeting, held in Pittsburgh, March 17-18,
1967,2 selected two advanced enterprises for detailed attention. The
one was the system which Professor John Horty had developed at
the University of Pittsburgh. As part of Project LITE it was set
up to retrieve computerized textual information from American
defense-related treaties for the U. S. Department of Defense.' The
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Washington.
t This is a revised and completely re-written version of a paper prepared for
a meeting of the working group on electronic data processing of the American
Society of International Law, held in Pittsburgh, 17-18 March 1967.
1Edwards, "Electronic Data Processing and International Law Documentation," 61 Am. J. of Int'l. L. 87 (1967).

2 The Am.
Soc'y of Int'l Law, "Electronic Data Processing and International Law Documentation," Transcript of Proceedings, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
17-18 March 1967 (2 Volumes).
3 See 8 AF JAG Law Rev. (No. 6), Nov-Dec 1966, Special Issue on LITE,
Legal Information Thru Electronics, reprinted in Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., August 1, 1967, at 51.
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other was the system which the author developed at the University
of Washington, and which is usually referred to as the United Nations
Treaty Series Project, or simply UNTS Project.' It relies on computerized coded information from all treaties in the United Nations
Treaty Series. It is used primarily for trend analyses and other
academic research in international law.
In preparation for the Pittsburgh meeting, the American Society
of International Law invited search requests from prospective participants. These search requests were to be processed before the meeting
so that the group would share some concrete examples with which
to illustrate the prospects and problems of electronic research methods. The particular search request which prompted this article was
directed to the UNTS Project. The search request asked for a listing
of all Soviet bilateral treaties having a textual reference to any ad hoc
commission. By way of research context, the request indicated that
it aimed at confirming and quantifying the notion that the Soviet
Union preferred ad hoc commissions over the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) for the settlement of disputes arising from treaties.
In the background was a question of practical policy. Where are
the lines of least resistance in developing Soviet agreement to impartial treaty-interpreting procedures?
Our response to the search request combined human and electronic resources as follows. We first looked through some of our
computer printouts listing all instruments in the United Nations
Treaty Series (UNTS) by parties, topics, dates of signature, institutional references, and other coded characteristics.' These materials
showed (1) that the search request was answerable in the precise
form in which it had been asked; (2) that the underlying assumption
about the Soviet preference for ad hoc commission over the ICJ
4 Rohn, "The United Nations Treaty Series Project,"
12 Int'l Stud. Q. 174
(1968).
The following unpublished tabulations show relevant analytical information. ("IGO" stands for international governmental organizations and is used
broadly for any and all agencies established by international treaties.) Table
4.1: "All IGO's by Frequency of Occurrence in UNTS." Table 4.2: Same
data ordered alphabetically by international organizations. Table 4.3: "All
IGO Occurrences in UNTS in Order of IGO Identifying Each Treaty by UNTS
Series and Number." Table 5.1: "Treaty-Making Frequency by Parties Over
Time." Table 5.2: "Frequency of Passive IGO References Over Time."
Table 7.1: "All Registrants Ordered by Number of Treaties Registered."
Table 7.2: "All Registrants Ordered by Number of Treaties with Matching
Party and Registrant."
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seemed to be essentially correct; and (3) that our data bank was
capable of responding to the original search request in a way that
would be more subtle and more complex than a simple listing of
Soviet treaties.
What most laymen would probably expect of a computerized
search was in the first two points but not the third. And yet it was
the third point which contributed the unique and most important
features of automated legal research. The computer satisfied the
first point by printing the list of Soviet treaties as requested and
counting a total of 47 references to ad hoc commissions. The second
point was a little more complicated. How did 47 compare with
Soviet treaty references to the ICJ? Could we assume it was known
how many ICJ references the Soviet Union had in its bilateral treaties?
It happened to be an easy number to remember-zero. But was
this fact so well known among international lawyers that it would
literally go without saying? Even if we assumed it was known, it
would be only one of many relevant facts. Most others would
remain hidden in irrelevant mazes unless ferreted out and made
visible by the computer in the sense of the third point of our response.
This, indeed, must have been the inner logic of the search
request. It was no idle exercise in numbers. It reached out for
sophistication-comparisons, concepts, frameworks, perspectives. But
the search request was not close enough to the data to ask all the
right questions all at once. Many of the best questions had to remain
implicit until intermediate results of the search enabled us to re-cast
them in answerable form. This is what man-machine systems are
especially well suited to do-to respond to implied but unasked
queries.
Our response to the unasked questions developed as an imaginary
dialogue between researcher and computer. It was as if we kept
saying to the computer: "While you are checking all the world's
treaties for A and B anyway, check also for C and D." One step
led to another. Items C and D made us curious about E and F,
and so it went on. The problem was how to limit our curiosity in
the face of the computer's practically unlimited capacity to produce
more and more information. One way to limit this information
explosion was to rank the items by relevance. But relevance is
relative, and arguable. For example, it was argued that a comparison
of Soviet treaties with Polish treaties was obviously the most relevant.
Presumably there would be many similarities and some subtle difInternational Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 4
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ferences. From the differences it might be possible to draw some
conclusions about the line of least resistance along which Soviet
treaties might develop toward a greater reliance on international
institutions for dispute settlement. But it was argued just as eloquently
on the other side that we should first chart comparable treaty patterns
of the United States and Canada, and that, without some such comparison, the Soviet and Polish figures would be as meaningless as
telephone numbers. But why should we stop after Canada? It might
be misleading to base treaty comparisons on superpowers and their
neighbors. Perhaps a medium power and its neighbor might provide
a better model of trends of treaty development. So it was argued to
take on France and Belgium, or Brazil and Uruguay, or India and
Burma. In all these cases, the problem was not one of how to ask
for and how to get additional information. The problem was where
to stop, and why.
There had to be a point of diminishing returns somewhere. But
it kept eluding us as long as we argued in theoretical terms alone.
As soon as we moved from speculation to experiments, a practical
solution appeared. It proved itself over and over again and was elevated to an operational principle in our computerized research. It
was simply to invest in what seemed at first an excessive number of
feedback cycles with more and more information as long as the results
remained diverse. Given computer speed, we would soon reach a
point where any additional information tended to repeat a given pattern. That, then, was the point of diminishing returns. That point
identified what was routine and what was unusual in treaty patterns.
Once we knew this about any one part of the inquiry we could go
on to the next.
So far we had assumed that in asking the computer for Soviet
(Polish, American, Canadian, etc.) treaties, the computer would
always check all the treaties of each above-named country. In other
words, we had taken it for granted that the "other party" was the
rest of the world. This would certainly yield some differences, and
hopefully some meaningful differences. But then we speculated that
the differences would come into much sharper focus if we could do
a double comparison. For instance, we were thinking about getting
one set of figures for Soviet treaties with the rest of the Soviet Bloc
and another for Soviet treaties with all non-Bloc countries. At the
same time, we could also get a double set for USA treaties, with NATO
and with non-NATO countries, and for various international organiInternational Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 4
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zations.6 As we approached the point of diminishing returns in these
permutations, we had meanwhile accumulated information on treaty
behavior by groups of countries, and we were beginning to think in
these terms. Perhaps group comparisons would be more meaningful
than individual ones? This idea led first to the usual geo-political
groupings like NATO, Warsaw Pact, Latin America, and so forth.
Many preliminary questions arose in connection with these groupings.
Should we include the United Kingdom with Europe? Should we
have a special group for Benelux even though the region is totally
within the Common Market? How should we handle the multiple
overlaps with NATO, Scandinavia, Commonwealth, and so forth?
Should Cuba and/or Yugoslavia be included with the Soviet Bloc?
Again, we solved most of these problems operationally by running
experiments with more than one alternative, and by choosing whichever combination seemed best to bring into focus the relevant information. For example, tentative results suggested that, within the
Soviet Bloc, a core area should be distinguished from the rest, and
that Yugoslavia should be kept apart from the entire Bloc. At another
point we started wondering about the wisdom of limiting our choice
of groups of States to the usual geo-political clusters. Should we not
also look at some of the groupings that had been generated by the
very process of automated research? For example, should we not
group States by their total number of treaties regardless of traditional
geo-political groupings? Might not some otherwise hidden distinctions
emerge if we divided the world into high-active, medium-active, and
low-active treaty makers? But by what standards should we measure
high, medium, and low? Again here, we refined our guesswork by
first testing a few alternative cutoff points on the computer against
our entire data bank. The following division seemed to give the best
results for this particular comparison: (1) States with 200 or more
treaties, (2) 100-199, (3) 50-99, (4) 1-49. Finally, we turned to
world-wide summary figures and divided all treaties by such formal
6 The earlier version of this article (see headnote) included four tables,
one each for some of the possible permutations. However, the information has
meanwhile been re-arranged and compressed into the sole Table 1 of this
article. The original four printouts were as follows: Table 10.1: "IGO
References in Treaties Between Selected States and Rest of World." Table
10.2: "IGO References in Treaties Between Selected States and Sino-Soviet
Bloc." Table 10.3: "Non-Signatory IGO References in Treaties Between
IGO's and Rest of World." Table 10.4: "Non-Signatory IGO References in
Treaties Between IGO's and Sino-Soviet Bloc." Some copies of the original
four tables are available on request for professional distribution.
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 4

TABLE I
UNTS PROJECT, PHASE 10
INSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES IN TREATIES
UNTS VOLUMES 1-503
NUMBER
ALL
TREATIES

NUMBER
ALLIGO
REFERS

AVERAG
IGOREF
PERTRT

(3)
U.S.S.R.
POLAND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
SET A-4 CORE SOVBLOC
SET B-12 SINOSOVBLOC
YUGOSLAVIA
CUBA
SET B-12 + YUGO + CUBA

(4)
259
161
192
105
631
801
314
49
1009

(5)
56
61
71
33
193
245
134
15
339

(6)
0.22
0.38
0.37
0.31
0.31
0.31
0.43
0.31
0.34

U.S.A.
UNITED KINGDOM
CANADA
SET C-3 CORE NATO
FRANCE
GERMANY(WEST)
ITALY
SET D-3 BENELUX
SET E-6 COMMON MARKET
SET F-3 CORE SCAND
SET G-12 EURONATO
SET H-25 WEST EUROPE
SET I-5 CORE COMWEALTH
SET J-23 WEST INDUST

2547
895
307
3482
321
229
299
812
1507
767
2381
3498
1509
5451

685
384
103
1089
149
135
171
370
758
398
1238
1734
575
2148

0.27
0.43
0.34
0.31
0.46
0.59
0.57
0.46
0.50
0.52
0.52
0.50
0.38
0.39

BRAZIL
CUBA
MEXICO
SET K-22 LATIN AMERICA
INDIA
ISRAEL
JAPAN
SET L-27 NONBLOC ASIA
GHANA
U SOUTH AFRICA
UAR/EGYPT
SET M-36 AFRICA
SET N-91 NONBLOC DEVELOP

148
49
104
1288
207
183
245
1753
33
111
133
641
4086

61
15
43
433
94
61
115
865
26
25
93
469
2013

0.41
0.31
0.41
0.34
0.45
0.33
0.47
0.49
0.79
0.23
0.70
0.73
0.49

SET
SET
SET
SET

5631
2266
1833
1333

2184
999
766
734

0.39
0.44
0.42
0.55

-

TOTAL STATE-STATE BILATS
TOTAL ONLY STATES MULTIS
TOTAL IGOS IN ANY COMBIN

5902
613
1191

2292
848
904

0.39
1.38
0.76

-

WORLD TOTAL

7949

4211

0.53

LINE

CODE

(1)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

(2)
128
102
32
53
-

140
30
131
130
19
42
46
61
-

12
30
82
55
60
64
47
127
129
-

-

-

PARTY/SET

0-16
P-17
Q-26
R-72

200+ TREATIES
100-199 TREATIES
50-99 TREATIES
1-49 TREATIES
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20 NOVEMBER 1967
COL 6
-WORLD
AVERAG

NUMBER
UN SET
REFERS

PERCENT
COL 8/5

NUMBER
AD HOC
REFERS

PERCENT
COL 10/5

(7)
-0.31
-0.15
-0.16
-0.22
-0.22
-0.22
-0.10
-0.22
-0.19

(8)
8
12
25
9
50
65
40
11
111

(9)
14.3
19.7
35.2
27.3
25.9
26.5
29.9
73.3
32.7

(10)
47
48
43
23
137
174
90
4
218

(11)
83.9
78.7
60.6
69.7
71.0
71.0
67.2
26.7
64.3

-0.26
-0.10
-0.19
-0.22
-0.07
0.06
0.04
-0.07
-0.03
-0.01
-0.01
-0.03
-0.15
-0.14

399
181
39
591
71
47
59
162
328
189
552
845
289
1122

58.2
47.1
37.9
54.3
47.7
34.8
34.5
43.8
43.3
47.5
44.6
48.7
50.3
52.2

162
99
33
265
47
41
70
102
233
140
403
558
144
660

23.6
25.8
32.0
24.3
31.5
30.4
40.9
27.6
30.7
35.2
32.6
32.2
25.0
30.7

-0.12
-0.22
-0.12
-0.19
-0.08
-0.20
-0.06
-0.04
0.26
-0.30
0.17
0.20
-0.04

24
11
24
261
60
42
82
610
17
20
54
309
1205

39.3
73.3
55.8
60.3
63.8
68.9
71.3
70.5
65.4
80.0
58.1
65.9
59.9

34
4
18
143
31
18
31
218
8
3
35
125
637

55.7
26.7
41.9
33.0
33.0
29.5
27.0
25.2
30.8
12.0
37.6
26.7
31.6

-0.14
-0.09
-0.11
0.02

1070
542
453
482

49.0
54.3
59.1
65.7

743
382
242
203

34.0
38.2
31.6
27.7

-0.14
0.85
0.23

1081
476
663

47.2
56.1
73.3

840
117
172

36.6
13.8
19.0

0.00

2381

56.5

1133

26.9
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.667

NUMBER
COURTS
REFERS
(12)
0
1
0
0

1
1

PERCENT
COL 12/5
(13)
0.0
1.6
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.4
8.2
6.7
3.8

67
36
6
108
23
12
15
43
87
45
136
200
52
249

9.8
9.4
5.8
9.9
15.4
8.9
8.8
11.6
11.5
11.3
11.0
11.5
9.0
11.6

538

12.8
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categories as bilateral, multilateral, and organizational. And so the
work proceeded through many feedback cycles from the researcher's
desk to the computer and back again until it settled into the format
shown in Table 1, infra, p. 666.
11-Findings
The computer checked all Soviet bilateral treaties in the United
Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) and found 47 textual references to
international ad hoc commissions of various sorts. The search covered
the entire UNTS from the beginning to the present, i.e., approximately
the 20-year period from 1945 to 1965, or more precisely, UNTS
Volumes 1 to 503. This finding of 47 textual references to ad hoc
commissions is meaningless as such. It derives its analytical significance from the multiple comparative setting of Table 1. There, the
figure of 47 is but one among 440 pieces of interrelated information.
Most of Table 1 belongs to the category of "perspective" information rather than "retrieval" information. Popularly expressed,
"retrieval" information is nothing but a substitute for rote memory,
or for a manual filing system. It is the act of putting information
into machine-usable form and having the computer recall and print
out anything in exactly the same way in which it has been put in. The
only advantages over manual methods are speed and accuracy. By
contrast, "perspective" information complements and refines the expert's sense of proportions. "Perspective" information in this sense
is something new. It has never been put into the computer as such.
It is created jointly by researcher and computer out of raw data. The
man-machine system thereby resembles and simulates the human
expert's mental process of sifting, comparing, rank-ordering, and generally organizing information. Thus, "perspective" information is the
result of having the computer re-arrange raw facts until they fall into
the kind of patterns which we normally associate with a systematic
body of knowledge. Let us now explore Table 1 for some of the
possibilities of using the man-machine system to generate "perspective" information.
The Soviet Setting
In the original query, there was a clear implication to go beyond
counting Soviet treaty references to ad hoc commissions (Line 1,
Column 10). For instance, there is now a total for all institutional
references in Soviet treaties (Line 1, Column 5). For sheer conInternational Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 4
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venience, this 47:56 comparison comes also as a percentage, 83.9%
(Line 1, Column 11). This percentage will be important in comparisons with other countries but we must first exhaust the findings
about Soviet treaty practice alone. Another implication of the original
inquiry was to look at the total number of Soviet treaties to get some
idea of the relative importance of institutional references in all Soviet
treaties. There are 259 Soviet bilateral treaties (Line 1, Column 4).
For convenience, the same information is expressed as institutional
references per treaty, 0.22, or an average of just over one such reference per five treaties (Line 1, Column 6). Comparisons with other
national averages are made easy by Column 7. The information is
in substance the same as that in Column 6 except that it is expressed
as deviation from world average. Given a world average of 0.53
institutional references per treaty (Line 49, Column 6), the Soviet
rate of 0.22 (Line 1, Column 6) is 0.31 below world average (Line
1, Column 7). The significance of this figure will shortly become
apparent from various other comparisons.
While still within the Soviet treaty pattern, we might wish to
know which other international institutions are being referred to in
Soviet treaties. We know now that out of a total of 56 references, 47
concern ad hoc commissions but we do not know what the remaining
9 are. We knew from other aspects of the UNTS Project that the
United Nations and the Specialized Agencies account for the largest
bulk of all institutional references, and that the ICJ and other international courts account for another major portion. We therefore had
the computer divide all institutional references into three groups as
follows: (1) United Nations and U. N.-related agencies, (2) ad hoc
commissions, and (3) international courts. The results show that
8 of the 9 other references in Soviet treaties come under the United
Nations category (Column 8) and that none applies to an international court (Column 12). The ninth reference must be somewhere
outside these three categories. It probably concerns a regional organization or any other non-U.N.-related permanent agency. If we want
to eliminate the distortion caused by absolute figures, the percentages
will be most useful for comparisons among various States and groups
of States (Columns 9, 11, and 13).
So far we have learned some new but rather barren facts about
Soviet treaties. It may intuitively seem low for a major country to
have only 259 treaties in the entire UNTS. This is a rate of about
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 4
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12 treaties per year.- But we cannot be sure until we look at comparable figures for other countries. Similarly, it may seem that 83.9%
is rather high for the share of ad hoc commissions in all institutional
references but how would anyone be able to prove that there was
anything unusual about this percentage in the case of the Soviet Union?
Also, the Soviet average of 0.22 institutional references per treatyis it high or low in comparison with other countries? Finally, it would
seem obvious that the Soviet score of zero in regard to international
courts must be low but the question still remains how many other
countries show the same score of zero, and especially which ones?
Table 1 downward from Line 1 shows the answers for some other
countries and groups of countries. This will not be a detailed commentary on each of the 440 findings of Table 1. It will merely select
some of the more significant cases to illustrate the main points of
substance and to show the reader how to translate the results of a
man-machine system into the familiar language of legal research.
Comparisons with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary
Looking at the findings of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (Lines 2, 3, 4), we find that the Soviet Union has more treaties
than any of these three countries but that the difference is not as
great as might have been expected (Column 4). What is more surprising, perhaps, is the size of the differences among the other three
countries. All the more surprising, then, is the constancy of institutional references per treaty for the three countries. They average
approximately one reference per three treaties. Only the rate of the
Soviet Union itself is much lower, one reference per five treaties
(Column 6). The Soviet rate is also much lower in the share of
U.N.-related references, approximately 14% as compared with 20%,
35%, and 27% in the three other countries (Column 9). By contrast, the Soviet share of ad hoc commission references is higher than
that of any other Eastern European countries, i.e., 84% as compared
with 79%, 61%, and 70%. Finally, court references show the Soviet
Union at zero in equal company with Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
Poland is the only country of the core area of the Soviet Bloc (and, as
For a detailed analysis of the so-called gap problem in the UNTS see Rohn,
"Canada in the United Nations Treaty Series: A Global Perspective," 4
Canadian Yb. of Int'l Law (1966), and Rohn, "Turkish Treaties in Global
Perspective, 6 Turkish Yb. of int'l Rel. 119 (1965). No analogous studies of
the gap have yet been made for other countries and we have therefore no
choice but to disregard the gap for comparative purposes.
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No, 4
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we will soon see, of the entire Sino-Soviet Bloc) that has a single reference to an international court.8 Cuba has a similar reference.' Both
cases show rather special circumstances."0 We can conclude for the first
four countries of the Soviet Bloc that their rate of treaty reliance on
international institutions seems to be generally uneven. They all seem
to prefer ad hoc commissions over U.N. agencies, and U.N. agencies
over international courts. The Soviet Union is the extreme representative of what seems to be a general characteristic of Soviet Bloc
countries. The hierarchy of the other three countries is inconsistent.
Poland resembles the extreme Soviet position in the low share of
U.N-related agencies but on the other hand Poland is farthest from
the Soviet model in the rate of total institutional references per treaty.
Also, as we just saw, Poland is the only Soviet Bloc country with a
court reference.
Soviet Bloc
The next two lines show for the first time the treaty patterns of
groups of States as groups." Line 5 comprises all treaties of the four
above countries collectively styled "CORE SOVBLOC." Line 6
includes all 12 countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc as usually defined,
excluding Yugoslavia and Cuba (Lines 7 and 8). Here we see that
the extension from Core Soviet Bloc to Sino-Soviet Bloc is nearly
negligible in relevant treaty behavior. While the number of countries
increases from 4 to 12 (by 200% ) the number of treaties increases
only from 631 to 801, or by about 25%. Most of the percentages
remain the same or nearly the same. Most of the quantitatively significant intra-Bloc deviations seem to occur within the Core Bloc.
A standard agreement with the U.N. Special Fund about financing a project,
344 UNTS 29, dated 15 Oct. 1959.
9 As in note 8 above, a standard agreement with the U.N. Special Fund
about financing a project, 390 UNTS 35, dated 10 March 1961.
10 Both are standard agreements rather than individually negotiated wordings.
Also, both provide for ICJ involvement in dispute settlement but only through
a remote and indirect procedure. If two appointed arbitrators cannot agree on
a third one, then the President of the ICJ shall appoint the third arbitrator.
11 All groups of countries are identified on Table 1 by the initial term "SET"
followed by a capital letter in alphabetical order, and by a numeral which indicates the total membership of the group. For instance, SET D-3 BENELUX
includes the following three countries: Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg.
Most groupings follow generally accepted definitions. Doubtful cases are explained in the text where it seemed important, or summarily categorized. A
full list of all group members as used in Table 1, A through R, is available on
request for professional distribution.
8
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Yugoslavia
As soon as we come to Yugoslavia, however, the pattern changes
abruptly and significantly. Even before looking at Yugoslavia's reliance on institutions, we can notice a major difference by merely comparing her total number of treaties to Soviet Bloc countries. Yugoslavia has 25% more treaties than the Soviet Union, over 50% more
than Czechoslovakia, almost twice as many as Poland, and three times
as many as Hungary (Column 4). The number of institutional references is in part even more discrepant, i.e., about 21 times as many as
the Soviet Union and Poland and twice as many as Czechoslovakia
(Column 5). The rate of references per treaty is almost twice that
of the Soviet Union and higher than that of any Soviet Bloc country
(Column 6). In reliance on U.N. agencies as against ad hoc commissions, Yugoslavia is more U.N.-oriented than any Bloc country
except Czechoslovakia. The most dramatic difference, however, between Yugoslavia and the Bloc is in court references, both in absolute
figures and in percentages (Columns 12 and 13). There is no longer
any similarity at all and we must look, for the first time, beyond the
Soviet Bloc toward Western countries to find patterns that are comparable to the Yugoslavian. And so, disregarding Cuba because its
mid-period shift from West to East cancels out much of its treaty profile, we turn to the United States, NATO, Western Europe, and other
non-Bloc countries and groups.
Comparisons with the United States
All previous findings of the UNTS Project have made a special
point of the giant-dwarf proportion between American treaties and
those of most other countries in the world. It can hardly be often
enough repeated, or overemphasized, how gigantic the American preponderance is in the world's network of treaties (Column 4). American treaties outnumber those of the Soviet Union at the approximate
rate of 10: 1. Even Great Britain, the world's second largest treatymaker, is outnumbered by America at the rate of about 3:1. The only
way to make the United States comparable is to group other countries
together. Even so, the United States outnumbers the entire 36-State
group of Africa at the rate of 4: 1, the entire 12-State Sino-Soviet Bloc
at better than 3:1, the 22-State group of Latin America at 2: 1, and
the total of the 6 Common Market countries as well as the 5 core
countries of the Commonwealth at somewhat less than 2:1. The only
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groupings of similar size are the 12 Continental NATO countries
(Line 21), the 25 countries of Western Europe (Line 22), and all
the world's 91 underdeveloped countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc
(Line 38). In view of this vast disproportion of magnitudes, American
treaties can be compared to others only by reminding the analyst to
make mental quantum jumps when dealing in absolute figures. Of
course, percentages (Column 6) remove the problem and make American treaties reasonably comparable, and probably surprising in other
ways,
Contrary to common-sense expectation, the American rate is
lower than that of any listed Soviet Bloc country except the Soviet
Union itself. One might suppose that somehow the statistics carry a
bias which lowers the rate of Western countries. But a glance farther
down Column 6 destroys this hypothesis. In fact, common sense holds
true in that most Western countries score considerably higher than
most Soviet Bloc countries. Only the United States shows such an
exceptionally low rate of treaty reliance on international institutions.
On the other hand, within the limits of its own reliance on institutions,
the United States allows a much larger share for U.N. agencies than
does any listed Soviet Bloc country, and also somewhat more than
most other Western countries. The American share of U.N. reliance
is more than twice that of the Sino-Soviet Bloc average (Line 6) and
about 10% above that of the average of 23 Western industrialized
countries (Line 24). On ad hoc commissions, the American percentage is only slightly lower than that of most Western countries and,
of course, much lower than that of the Soviet Bloc countries. In
references to international courts, the United States is also low by
Western standards although not at the bottom. Even lower than the
United States are Great Britain, Germany, Italy, South Africa, and
Canada, in this descending order. Canada is by far the lowest of
major Western countries in this respect. All of them, however, even
Canada, are much higher than any of the Soviet Bloc countries. Yugoslavia scores with the lowest Western countries, between Italy and
South Africa, but considerably above Canada and quite out of reach
of the Soviet Bloc.
It is not easy to sum up the American pattern. There is a clear
political message in the low rating of institutional references in general, and courts in particular. It suggests a classical big-power reluctance to accept formal restraints in its international behavior. On the
one hand, this reluctance contrasts oddly with the gigantic role played
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by the United States in international legal processes. On the other
hand, there is one major exception. American treaties favor U.N.
agencies. While American reliance on international institutions in
general is very low, and almost as low as that of the Soviet Union,
American reliance on U.N. agencies is higher than that of any other
Western country, much higher than the world average, and incomparably higher than the Soviet Bloc.
Other Western Countries
By now the reader will have seen the way in which the tabular
material can be used for perspective information on Soviet treaties and
institutional references. We need not translate all the remaining information from numbers into words. A few of the highlights may
suffice to suggest further explorations. For instance, the losers of
World War II show exceptionally high but uneven rates of institutional
reliance (Column 6, Lines 16, 17, and 32). For instance, Japan
scores near average on total institutions but leads the world in reliance
on courts. The Japanese rate is more than twice that of the United
States and almost four times the rate of Canada. Germany, by contrast, has the highest rate on total institutions among major Western
countries but is quite low on courts. Curiously, a similar pattern
emerges from French treaties but it is closer to the Japanese than to
the German model. France is moderately high on institutional references in general and extremely high on courts in particular. Indeed,
France has by far the highest court rate of any major Western country.
The contrast with Canada on the opposite end of the pole is one of
the most dramatic of the entire tabulation, and hard to explain. Also
surprisingly, the countries of Continental Western Europe score generally higher on courts than do Anglo-Saxon countries. Underdeveloped countries average high scores on institutions generally, and
on U.N. agencies and courts in particular. Conversely and necessarily,
they score low on ad hoc commissions. Their averages tend to hide
some widely scattered scores within the group. Africa generally scores
high on total institutions as well as on courts while Latin America
scores low on total institutions but high on courts. For instance, Haiti
and Panama are very low while Dahomey and the Ivory Coast are
very high (not shown on present tabulation). South Africa places the
least reliance on international institutions among Western countries.
It scores lower than the United States and comes within the smallest
shown fraction of a point of tying with the Soviet Union for the world's
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bottom spot. Likewise, except for Canada, South Africa is the lowest
Western country on court references.
Types and Frequency of Treaties
The remaining information concerns neither individual state nor
the familiar geo-political groupings of countries. Instead, it relates
to groups based on formal criteria of legal statistics and created by
the process of computerized research. The first group shows countries
by their treaty-making frequency. There is not much difference between the first three groups-high, medium, and low. Only the bottom
group with less than 50 UNTS treaties shows a substantial increase ih
relative reliance on international institutions. Other UNTS Project
findings suggest that this increase is deceptive. The very low number
of treaties signed by those countries, their recent independence and
immediate involvement in the various aid and development programs
of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies let the percentages
of institutional references appear misleadingly high. As these countries grow into the normal proliferations of treaty making, the percentage of their early institutionalism is bound to go down.
The last four lines of Table 1 concern various forms of world
totals by three of the major categories of treaties, ( 1) bilateral treaties
between States (Line 45), (2) multilateral treaties among States
(Line 46), and (3) treaties which involve at least one international
organization as signatory regardless of whether the other party is a
State or international organization, and whether the form is bilateral
or multilateral. The number of treaties in these three categories relates
approximately as 10:1:2. Institutional references differ inversely but
inconsistently. They are the most dramatic of any group differences
shown in this study. The rate of institutional reliances is lowest among
the State-State bilaterals, highest among State multilaterals, and intermediate among organizational treaties. The rates relate approximately
as 1:4:2. It seems reasonable that bilateral treaties between States
should have the least institutional references. What may surprise,
however, is the rank order of the other two. One might expect organizational treaties to have more such references than multilaterals among
States. This may in fact be true. However, a coding rule excluded all
"self-references," i.e., references to an institution that was also a signatory. Thus, international organizations carry a bias in the data base
of the UNTS Project which, paradoxically, makes their treaties appear
less institution-oriented than they actually are. Nevertheless, it is
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 4

676/

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

doubtful whether this fact alone can explain the spectacular difference
in references between organizational and multilateral State treaties.
The image is further confounded by the uneven distribution of the
difference over the three types of institutional references. In fact, the
organizational treaties behave as experts would expect in two of the
three types of references, i.e., U.N. agencies and courts. They clearly
lead in U.N. references, and dramatically so in court references (Columns 9 and 13). The only type where they fail to lead is in ad hoc
commissions.
Some of the overall perspectives on the world's network of treaties
(Line 49) may already be familiar from other UNTS Project publications. 12 We know that there have been about 8,000 treaties in the
first 20 years since World War II, and we know that slightly more
than half of them on the average contain a reference to an international institution. We did not know before but found here that of the
institutional references about half concern U.N. agencies; one quarter,
ad hoc commissions; one eighth, courts; and that the final eighth (unaccounted for here) concerns various other institutions, mostly regional and non-U.N. global.
III-Conclusion
It should be clear even without a specific disclaimer that findings
such as these are not being presented as a substitute for a depth
analysis of Soviet treaties,'' or treaties in general.' 4 But neither is a
12

In addition to notes 4 and 7 above, see Rohn, "Institutionalism in the

Law of Treaties: A Case of Combining Teaching and Research," 59 Proceedings of Am. Soc'y of Int'l L. 93 (1965); Rohn, "War as Reflected in the U.N.
Treaty Series," 24 Proceedings of the San Diego Institute on World Aflairs 276

(1966); Rohn, "The U.N. Treaty Series Project as Computerized Jurisprudence," 2 Texas Int'l L. Forum 167 (1966); Lejnieks, "The Nomenclature of
Treaties: A Quantitative Analysis," 2 Texas Int'l L. Forum 175 (1966);

Vaughn, "Expropriation in International Law: Traditional vs. Quantitative
Research," 2 Texas Int'l L. Forum 189 (1966); O'Hara, "Trends in the Use of
Compromissory Clauses," unpublished paper presented to 1967 Convention
of the International Studies Association, New York City, 14 April 1967, copies
available for professional distribution; Phillips, The Bilateral Treaty Network
of Non-Western States, forthcoming in Deener, editor, De Lege Pactorum.
13 The standard work is Triska and Slusser, The Theory, Law and Policy of
Soviet Treaties (1962). More recent literature includes Prugh, "Soviet Status
of Forces Agreements: Legal Limitations or Political Devices," 1963 Mil.
Law Rev. 1; Bracht, "Grundziige des Internationalen Vertragsrechts nach
Sowjetischer Vblkerrechtstheorie," 4 Jahrbuch fiir Ostrecht 73 (1963); Triska,
"Soviet Treaty Law: A Quantitative Analysis," 29 Law and Contemp. Prob.

896 (1964); Molodcov, "International Law Studies in the USSR," in USSR
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traditional treatment of any aspect of treaty law a substitute. for the
particular information and insight obtainable through a man-machine
system for the present type. The two are complementary rather than
competitive.
1. Methodology. It would have been impossible by any noncomputerized method to contrast Soviet treaty characteristics with
the patterns of adjacent countries, non-Soviet Bloc countries, and
regional and other groups of countries. Neither would it be possible
to produce the intellectual fringe benefits of a global perspective at
little or no extra cost in time and effort. And yet we must beware of
expecting the computer to harmonize legal thought, or any thought.
The harmonies of thought that dwell in a computer are latent, like
the harmonies of music in a piano. To bring them to life it takes all
three elements: (a) the instrument itself, (b) technical dexterity, and
(c) some mental image of the final product. While obvious in music,
these ingredients are not yet quite so obvious in computerized legal
research. Here, too, the instrument itself is not enough even when
combined with technical dexterity. There must also be a human link
between the substantive problem in legal research and the response
potential in the computer. It is a kind of translation. At some point
of the process there has to be someone who is methodologically bilingual. Neither man nor machine alone can optimize the potential
Academy of Sciences, Social Sciences in the USSR 269 (1965); Ginsburgs,
"Soviet Status of Forces Agreements: Pre-War and Wartime Experience," 16
U. Toronto Law J. 368 (1966); Maggs and Jerz, "Significance of Soviet Accession to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property," 48 J. Pat.
Off. Soc'y 242 (1966); Schmitthoff, "Commercial Treaties and International
Trade Transactions in East-West Trade," 20 Vand. L. Rev. 355 (1967); Ramundo, Peaceful Coexistence: InternationalLaw in the Building of Communism

(1967).
4
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Am. J. of Int'l L. No. 3 (October 1967), Special Issue on the Law of

Treaties; Blix, Treaty-Making Power (1960); Chiu, The Capacity of International Organizations to Conclude Treaties (1966); Degan, L'Interprdtation
des Accords en Droit International (1963); Holloway, Modern Trends in
Treaty Laws (1967); Hoyt, The Unanimity Rule in the Revision of Treaties, a
Reexamination (1959); Hudson, International Legislation (1931); Kasme,
La Capacitg de l'Organisation des Nations Unies de Conclure des Trait's
(1960); McDougal, Lasswell and Miller, The Interpretationof Agreements and
World Public Order (1967); McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961); Schneider,
The Treaty-Making Power of International Organizations (1959); Toscano,
The History of Treaties and InternationalPolitics (1966); Wilson, The International Law Standard in Treaties of the United States (1953); 27 Zeitschrift
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of computerized research. They must fuse into one operational system. Then and then only does computerized research "work" in
international law.
2. Substance. The factual findings of this study lend themselves
to the following interpretations.
(1) The treaties of the Soviet Union show a world-wide low in
their reliance on international institutions, and an absolute zero in
their reliance on courts.
(2) The other Soviet Bloc countries are also low on institutions,
but not nearly so low as the Soviet Union itself. They are also at or
near zero on courts.
(3) Yugoslavia has clearly moved out of the Soviet Bloc pattern
on both counts, and especially so on courts.
(4) The United States is surprisingly similar to the Soviet Union
in percentages but not in absolute figures, and not with regard to
U.N. agencies and courts.
(5) Other Western industrialized countries are more institutionoriented than the United States, and much more so than the Soviet
Union. Yet, there are wide differences among them, especially between Anglo-Saxon and Continental European.
(6) Underdeveloped countries are the most institution-oriented
by percentages but this may well be a function of certain transient
factors among new States because, among them, Africa is highest and
Latin America lowest.
(7) There is little difference among high-active, medium-active,
and low-active treaty makers except that the very lowest in total
activity are the very highest in reliance on institutions. The qualification of transience in Item (6) above also applies here.
(8) There are major and spectacular differences among formal
types of treaties-bilateral, organizational, and multilateral, in this
ascending order of reliance on institutions.
3. Policy. The substantive findings suggest the following policy
points to be kept in mind when negotiating with the Soviet Union
about dispute settlement clauses in draft treaties, including the International Law Commission's 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of
Treaties.'
15 U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 21st Sess., Supp. No. 9 (A/6309/Rev. 1) Reports
of the International Law Commission. For official comments by Member
States, see U.N. Doc. No. A/6827/Add.2, 6 Oct. 1967, Law of Treaties,
Comments by United States of America, see especially at 11 and 12 for stateInternational Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 4

A Computer Search in Soviet Treaties /679
(1) Unbroken Soviet practice suggests we should not expect a
full-fledged commitment to ICJ settlement in a bilateral treaty. Therefore, it would seem that negotiations on this point, if successful, would
have to sacrifice so much else that even the attempt is probably in
most cases inadvisable.
(2) Our data bank does not identify all signatories of multilateral treaties, and there may still be many unexamined variations
for individual countries. However, the spectacular increase of court
reliance in all multilateral treaties makes it at least probable that this
would be a line of lesser resistance. Hence, where there is a choice
between bilateral and multilateral modes of agreement, the multilateral
would seem preferable for the purpose of introducing a judicial settlement clause into Soviet treaty practice.
(3) Judicial settlement itself is a sliceable concept and a compromise solution on the model of Polish and Cuban U.N. Special Fund
agreements may be better than no solution at all. 6 In those cases,
the settlement procedure itself is merely arbitrational but the ICJ
becomes involved, although only potentially and, even then, marginally, if the two first-named arbitrators fail to agree on a third.
Although a very thin achievement in itself, it might accomplish an
important long-range educational function in gradually habituating
the Soviet Government to the idea of involving the ICJ in dispute
settlement.
(4) Soviet distrust of judicial settlement applies not only to
treaties with Western countries but equally to treaties with other Soviet
Bloc countries. Therefore, a sophisticated Western legal diplomacy
could try to encourage the use of judicial settlement clauses in intraBloc treaties. If successful, and as the genuine disagreements within
the Soviet Bloc are widening, the Soviet Government might come to
appreciate judicial agencies as good functional tools of international
legal craftsmanship, and might use them later in extra-Bloc treaties
as well.
(5) The continued and increased involvement of the Soviet
Union in international organizations makes its acceptance of judicial
settlement more likely in the long run as shown by the overwlhelming
odds by which organizational treaties favor judicial settlement. Also,
ments on reference to impartial determination including the ICJ, arbitration
or other methods, and U.N. Doc. No. A/6827, 31 Aug. 1967, Law of Treaties,
Comments by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at 25.
11See notes 8, 9, and 10 above.
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the standardized format of many organizational treaties makes it
technically most inconvenient to insist on special procedures for individual countries. This is, in fact, a form of multilateralization. In
this process, the bureaucratic compulsion to conform tends to win
over any but the most carefully considered political purposes. If
only the issues are small enough, the Soviet Government may thus
gradually slide into judicial settlements without ever having to face
a major political decision on this point.
Beyond the immediate prompting of this search in Soviet treaties
we might consider a more general observation. In taking this quantitative approach to the law of treaties we might ponder the fact that
some image of international political reality comes through in treaty
statistics. Treaties do fall into patterns, and the patterns make some
general political sense. They correspond by and large to expectations.
And yet, there have been some surprises at several points in this
study-inconsistencies, unexplained oddities, non-systemic features,
and a touch of apparent randomness here and there.
Might it not be possible to interpret this randomness as a sign of
opportunity? May it not mean that there is a certain amount of
loose-jointedness in the machinery of the world's treaties? If so, progressive innovation in the law of treaties is not limited to the dichotomy
between supporters and opponents among governments. There is a
third possibility. There may be indifference. There may be a large
array of non-purposive (and hence adaptable) attitudes to treaties
floating freely among the legal advisers of the world's foreign ministries. This fluidity may account for the random variations observed
in the computer printouts. We may interpret this as a hopeful sign
of flexibility in the way the historical stage is set for the 1.968 and
1969 Conferences on the Law of Treaties.
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